INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, a growing number of federal courts 1 have begun to utilize the "loss of a chance" remedial approach 2 to determine the value of probabilistic injuries 3 in competitive hiring and promotion cases in the employment discrimination context. 4 Under this approach, courts
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claim that it is sheer speculation to quantify the probability of a given individual receiving a competitive position in the absence of discrimination. 10 Unlike the medical malpractice context in which lost chance theory is more commonly utilized, 11 and where estimations concerning the chance of surviving a deadly disease are based upon past medical experiences of doctors treating patients with similar conditions, 12 the employment context provides no such convenient data to consult. 13 Even so, the absence of convenient evidence should not diminish the basic soundness of the lost chance approach to probabilistic injuries in competitive hiring and promotion cases.
14 Echoing Judge Posner to a substantial degree, this Article contends that, although uncertainty will inevitably challenge fact finders to fix percentages for these employment discrimination plaintiffs, 15 such uncertainty is not insuperable, and is, in (maintaining that the loss of chance doctrine fundamentally alters causation and lowers the burden of proof in medical malpractice cases). Even so, lost chance theory has made significant inroads in the medical malpractice context in the last twenty-five years or so.
See GREEN, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("For the most part, courts have followed Professor
King's suggestion that the harm be reconceptualized as a lost opportunity for cure rather than by adopting proportional liability for the adverse outcome.").
10.
See Wax, supra note 5, at 1134 (arguing that in the unconscious bias context, "[a] probabilistic system will justify itself neither in producing well-calibrated risk reduction nor in directing compensation to the right persons"). 11.
Fischer, supra note 9, at 605 ("Tort lawyers in the United States often think of 'loss of a chance' as a theory of 'probabilistic causation' that only applies to medical malpractice misdiagnosis cases.").
12.
See id. at 649 (arguing that chance calculations can be based on scientific studies that depend on the etiology of a disease or the characteristics of an injury); King, supra note 5, at 1386 ("One may deduce the probability figure [in medical malpractice cases] from so-called 'relative frequency' by looking at the way in which the same or similar forces operated in the past."). But see GREEN, supra note 2, at 66 ("I wonder about the quality of evidence employed even in medical malpractice lost opportunity cases.").
13.
See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("The difference between employment discrimination and medical and other forms of personal-injury tort is that the relevant probabilities may be more difficult to compute in the employment setting."). The bewildering array of permutations in calculating the probability of an applicant or employee receiving a job exists as a result of competing candidates' overlapping skill sets, numerous personality types (among both candidates and those who hire them), as well as other subjective intangibles, which play differing roles in deciding whether an individual will receive a job or promotion in a competitive circumstance. See Griffin v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 5 F.3d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1993); Bryson B. Moore, South
Carolina Rejects the Lost Chance Doctrine, 48 S.C. L. REv. 201, 214 (1996) ("A major problem with extending the doctrine to other fields is the greater difficulty in ascertaining the percentage chance lost."). 14. For a discussion on how probabilities can nevertheless still be determined in employment discrimination cases, see infra notes 229-38 and accompanying text.
15.
Indeed, all cases involve some degree of uncertainty. GREEN, supra note 2, at 5 ("Evidence is never perfect; uncertainty always exists."). fact, a traditional feature of employment discrimination remedies.
16
That being said, this Article does part company with Judge Posner over whether a "pure" or "symmetrical" version of lost chance theory 17 should be applied to so-called "better-than-even" chance cases.
18
In its place, this Article advocates for, based upon statutory 19 and prudentiaf 0 reasons, a public interest model for applying lost chance theory in the employment discrimination context. 21 Under this hybrid 16 .
See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977) . "After the victims [of discrimination] have been identified, the court must, as nearly as possible, 'recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no' unlawful discrimination." /d. (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 769 (1976) ). This process of recreating the past will necessarily involve a degree of approximation and imprecision. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1207 ("Yet no less uncertainty attends the efforts of triers of fact to fix the percentage of a plaintiffs negligence in a tort case governed, as most tort cases are today, by the rule of comparative negligence.") (citations omitted). For a discussion on whether an appropriate analogy exists between comparative negligence and lost chance theory, see infra note 77.
17. By "pure" or "symmetrical," this Article means a version of lost chance theory that advances an across-the-board application of lost chance theory in both highprobability and low-probability employment discrimination cases. (1999) (arguing for an asymmetrical pure lost chance theory in the tort context). Thus, an applicant with a 75% chance of being hired would receive 75% of the value of the job if successful in making out a claim of employment discrimination, not the entire amount as under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206; see also infra note 22.
18.
In "better-than-even" chance cases, a term coined by Professor Joseph King, a plaintiff has shown that she had a better-than-even chance of securing a favorable result in the absence of the defendant's wrongdoing. King, supra note 5, at 1387. Traditionally, most courts in better-than-even chance cases value the better-thaneven chance as though it had materialized or was certain to do so and award the full value of the job. See id. In contrast, both King and Chief Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit advocate pure lost chance theory under which damages are discounted in all cases in order to promote a more accurate loss allocation. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206; King, supra note 5, at 1387; see also Truckor, supra note 17, at 359.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20.
See infra Part III.B.
21.
Indeed, the impetus behind this public interest approach derives in part from a recent empirical observation made by Professor Michael Selmi. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1249 REv. , 1252 REv. (2003 .
In analyzing employment discrimination class action lawsuits, Sclmi found that " [t] here is no longer any concerted effort to eliminate discrimination; instead, efforts are directed at providing monetary compensation for past discrimination without particular concern for preventing future discrimination, or even remedying past discrimination, through injunctive relief." /d. The public interest model to lost chance theory in employment discrimination described in this Article is one attempt to revitalize the important public-regarding aspects of employment discrimination law; albeit through the use of a type of equitable monetary relief rather than through injunctive structural change as Selmi advocates. See
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A Public Interest Model 751 approach, lost chance theory will be applied in low probability cases where the plaintiff cannot prove a better-than-even chance of having received the position in the absence of discrimination, whereas the traditional "aU-or-nothing approach " 22 will apply in high probability, better-than-even chance cases. 23 This approach is based on the explicit recognition that employment discrimination law, unlike traditional tort law, seeks not only to make victims of discrimination whole, 24 but also to vindicate the statutory mandate of eradicating all unlawful discrimination from the economy. 25 As a consequence, the public id. at 1300; see also infra Part liLA.
22. As used throughout this Article, the traditional "aU-or-nothing approach" refers to a system in which " [c] ompensation is awarded if the plaintiff proves causation and other elements of liability by a designated standard of proof, which in civil actions is a preponderance of the evidence." Wax, supra note 5, at 1212; see also Truckor ( "Though the law of torts has many goals, its primary function is to determine when compensation for a harm caused should be required.").
25. Although one of the primary purposes of tort law is also deterrence, see Wax, supra note 5, at 1132-33, tort law seeks to find the appropriate balance of activity and risk. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 62 (describing the law and economics literature in tort law based on the idea "that if actors bear just the right amount of liability for the harm they cause, we will reach an optimal balance between accident costs and prevention costs"). Judge Learned Hand's famous formula of B < PL for determining whether to engage in risky behavior is based on this balance. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (stating that an actor's duty "to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables ... if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL"). /d. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), on the other hand, engages in no such balance, and bans outright all unlawful forms of employment discrimination based on a legislative determination that there is no social value to any of the proscribed forms of employment discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(!) to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... "). Not just deterrence, but eradication of unlawful employment discrimination from the workplace is the ultimate goal of laws like Title VII. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,771 (1976) (" [T] he denial of seniority relief to victims of illegal racial discrimination in hiring is permissible 'only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.'") (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) ) (emphasis added); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 292 (2002) (recognizing that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the statutory authority to vindicate both the private and public interests served by Title VII). WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW interest model permits punitive-like equitable relief2 6 against employers as an additional way to effectuate the statutory mandate animating employment discrimination law.
27
The public interest model will have beneficial effects in at least two important respects. First, it will promote additional deterrence even where the employee is unable to prove a better-than-even chance of receiving a position in the absence of discrimination, thereby eliminating the possibility of a discriminating employer being found completely blameless in circumstances in which unlawful conduct is clearly involved. 28 Second, and simultaneously, this modified approach will provide additional incentives for employers to take preventive actions to avoid liability, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in recent employment discrimination cases.
29
Critics of this model will no doubt argue that this approach is inconsistent with the loss allocation goals of tort law, 30 and that such an approach will needlessly overcompensate plaintiffs in a punitive manner.
31
In response, this Article makes a two-prong defense. First, these critics place too much emphasis on the private, "make whole" relief function of employment discrimination law, while paying insufficient heed to plausibly the more important public policy goals of these laws.
32
Secondly, and connected with the first point, the 26 . This Article will contend that "punitive-type" equitable relief is different in kind and nature than traditional punitive damages (which are awarded in employment discrimination law cases under the now familiar Kolstad framework 38 Part III asserts that pure lost chance theory conflicts with both statutory and prudential concerns underlying federal employment discrimination laws. To remedy these deficiencies, Part IV advances a public interest model for applying lost chance theory to probabilistic injuries in competitive hiring and promotion cases, thus providing a more consistent approach with regard to the public policy underlying the employment discrimination laws.
33.
See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 295. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Waffle House:
we are persuaded that, pursuant to Title VII and the [Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990], whenever the EEOC chooses from among the many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief.
34.
See supra note 25.
35.
By federal antidiscrimination legislation, this Article has in mind statutes like the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings: Separating Causationfrom Valuation
In his seminal piece on lost chance theory, King complained that courts in tort cases were guilty of applying the concept of causation improperly to matters of valuation. 39 Whereas causation concerns "the cause and effect relationship that must be established between tortious conduct and a loss before liability for that loss may be imposed, " 40 valuation involves "the process of identifying and measuring the loss that was caused by the tortious conduct. " 41 Put more succinctly, whereas causation concerns whether a plaintiff should recover for a loss, valuation concerns how much the plaintiff should recover for a loss. 42 Nevertheless, many courts today still follow an ali-or-nothing approach 43 under which the interest in a favorable outcome is either redressed completely or completely ignored.
44
In other words, these courts treat "the chance of avoiding a loss as if it were either a certainty or impossibility," and thus, "the plaintiff will recover for a lost opportunity only if it appears more likely than not that but for the tort some definitive adverse result would have been avoided. " 45 Contrariwise, if the probability of the lost chance does not rise above 50%, the plaintiff cannot meet her burden and recovers nothing under the traditional ali-or-nothing rule. 46 Thus, even if a plaintiff can show definitively that a defendant has engaged in tortious conduct, which has caused a loss of a chance of avoiding harm or of receiving a future benefit, under the ali-or-nothing approach the plaintiff recovers no compensation. 47 Seeking to rectify this unsatisfactory legal state of affairs, King advanced the notion that courts should treat the chance at a favorable outcome as a compensable interest in its own right.
49
Specifically he suggested that, "the loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence should be compensable and should be valued appropriately, rather than treated as an ali-or-nothing proposition. " 50 Thus, even in cases where the opportunity at a favorable outcome was not better than even, the interest lost thereby should still be appropriately valued. 51 Furthermore, he argued for an across-the-board application, referred to herein as "pure loss of chance theory. "
52 Under pure loss of chance theory, even in cases where the opportunity at a favorable outcome is better than even, the loss of interest is not treated as a certainty, but valued based on the probability that the plaintiff would have received a benefit or avoided harm. 53 doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival, regardless how flagrant the negligence"); King, supra note 5, at 1373. As King wrote: "The plaintiff who is able to demonstrate a probability of 50% or less that some future loss attributable to the tort will occur will be denied redress for that prospective loss. Yet it is manifest that the plaintiffs interests have been adversely affected." King, supra note 5, at 1373; see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 618 ("There is no theoretical basis for requiring that defendant completely destroy the chance in order to be subject to liability.").
49.
See King, supra note 5, at 1373; see also Todd S. Aagaard, Note, Identifying and Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1335, 1338-39 (1998) (criticizing courts and commentators for failing to properly identify the precise tort injury in lost chance cases). In this manner, King sought to value the true interest lost when future expectancies were at stake. See King, supra note 5, at 1373; see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 605 ("[l]f a physician negligently fails to diagnose a curable disease, and the patient is harmed by the disease, the physician should be liable for causing the 'loss of a chance' of a cure.").
50.
King, supra note 5, at 1354; see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 617 ("A major rationale for loss of a chance where plaintiff cannot prove traditional damage is that the chance of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a harm has value in itself that is entitled to legal protection."). 51.
King, supra note 5, at 1354. Identifying the interest harmed as the "loss of a chance" in these cases may lead to another difficult issue: "whether persons deprived of an opportunity of avoiding harm who nevertheless do not suffer the harm may recover for the lost opportunity." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 26 cmt. n.
As discussed below, however, commentators have made a distinction between lost chance theory where the harm has already occurred as opposed to increased risk theory, where the future harm is still speculative. See infra note 92. In any event, although this distinction is clearly important in the medical malpractice context, it is less likely to be so in the employment discrimination context in which lost chance will apply only if employer liability has been established for engaging in unlawful discrimination in the first instance. See infra Part II. A.
52.
See Truckor, supra note 17, at 358 (defining "pure loss of a chance theory"). 53.
King, supra note 5, at 1376. According to King: "Loss of a chance should be compensable even if the chance is not better than even, and it should be recognized and valued as such rather than an ali-or-nothing proposition. Any other rule fails to WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
B. The Cancer Misdiagnosis Hypothetical
In order to more clearly explain how King's lost chance theory operates in practice, it is helpful to compare the manner in which many jurisdictions to this day still resolve these tort issues under the ali-ornothing approach, as compared to how the lost chance theory would apply in similar circumstances.
The most common scenario contemplated for these purposes, and in fact derived from a scenario set out by King himself, occurs in the medical malpractice context.
54
Under this scenario, a patient goes to the doctor on date X and receives a clean bill of health. Three months later on date Y, that same patient goes to the same doctor, is diagnosed with cancer, and is told that she has now only a 10% chance of surviving the cancer. If Under the traditional aU-or-nothing approach, the question posed would be whether the plaintiff could prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the doctor's negligence in misdiagnosing the patient's cancer more likely than not caused the patient's death. 5 6 In this analysis, the plaintiff seeks redress for the patient's premature death in terms of the value of that patient's life to others had she lived. 57 However, because the patient never had more than a 40% chance of surviving the cancer (even under the best case scenario of being properly diagnosed on date X), the plaintiff will not be able to meet her evidentiary burden of establishing that the doctor's negligent actions caused the patient's death. 58 Thus, under the aU-or-nothing approach, the plaintiff would receive no recovery, even though the doctor has clearly engaged in some negligence and harmed the patient in some real way by the misdiagnosis.
59
Under the loss of a chance approach, the critical distinction is how the court identifies the interest that has been destroyed. 60 Whereas the interest thought to be harmed in the aU-or-nothing approach is the life of 56.
Put slightly differently, the question would be whether the doctor's negligence was a "but for" cause of the plaintiffs injury. See King, supra note 5, at 1355, 1367 ("[Tlhe ali-or-nothing ... rule denies compensation for the loss of a notbetter-than-even chance of avoiding some adverse result.").
51. See 61 Under lost chance theory, therefore, the causation inquiry devolves into a more easily satisfied inquiry: whether the plaintiff can establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the doctor's negligent malpractice caused the destruction of a certain degree of chance that the patient had at survival. 62 In most cases of this type, the answer to this refined causation question will be "yes."
What remains, then, is the valuation inquiry; that is, once one re,:ognizes that the loss of a chance is a cognizable interest for which redress may be sought, one must decide how to go about valuing that interest. 63 Initially, in valuing the extent of the loss, the pre injury condition or preexisting condition of the victim should be taken into account.
64 To do this, the court simply takes the difference between the chance of survival prenegligence and the chance of survival postnegligence and then multiplies this figure by the value of the individual's life had she lived. 65 To be more concrete, if the patient's life was valued at $100,000 and the loss of opportunity is quantified as 30% (40% prenegligence chance minus 10% postnegligence chance), 61 .
See id.
62.
/d. at 1394 (" [W] hile the loss of a not-better-than-even chance of avoiding some adverse result should be a compensable loss, it still must be established that the defendant caused the destruction of that chance."). In other words, "the all-or-nothing idea may continue to be applied to causation even if it is abandoned for the purposes of valuation." /d. at 1395; see also Truckor, supra note 17, at 358. This crucial point appears to be the most difficult distinction to grasp for opponents of the lost chance approach. See, e.g., Weigand, supra note 9, at 301 ("The effect of the [theory of recovery] is that it alters the traditional 'more likely than not' burden of proof."); see also Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995) ("We are persuaded that the 'the loss of chance doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the requisite degree of medical certitude necessary to establish a causal link between the injury of a patient and the tonious conduct of a physician.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993)).
63. See King, supra note 5, at 1381. 64.
/d. at 1356, 1385. In this scenario, the preexisting condition could be defined as "a disease, condition, or force that has become sufficiently associated with the victim to be factored into the value of the interest destroyed, and that has become so before the defendant's conduct has reached a similar stage." /d. at 1357 (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §52, at 321-22 (4th ed. 1971)).
65. This approach is based on the "conjunction principle." See King, supra note 5, at 1382, 1389 ("A better method of valuation would measure a compensable chance as the percentage probability by which the defendant's tortious conduct diminished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome."). The reason why the calculation works in this manner is because "'mathematical probability obeys a multiplicative conjunction principle, whereby the probability that two independent events both occur is equal to the mathematical product of their individual probabilities.'" /d. at 1388 (quoting L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 51-52 (1977)); see also id. at 1389 ("The conjunction principle should be an indispensable feature of the valuation process.").
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A Public Interest Model 759 then the plaintiff should be able to recover $30,000 under these circumstances. This number more closely represents the harm caused by the doctor's misdiagnosis.
66
The advantage of this outcome in not-better-than-even-chance cases is that the plaintiff will not be overcompensated unnecessarily for the value of her remaining life when the cancer in all probability would have killed her anyway.
67
At the same time, the patient is not undercompensated, although the doctor's actions may not have literally caused her death, because the doctor's action did make the patient's death more likely, and the chance of avoiding that adverse consequence should be quantified in some manner.
68
Concerns of fairness also counsel for an approach that provides some recovery for the patient's lost chance of survival because it is the doctor's negligence after all that has made it impossible to determine with any certainty what would have 66.
Some commentators have described a different type of valuation analysis based on the "increase of relative risk" or "attributable risk" for lost chance cases in the medical malpractice context. . Under these approaches, the fact finder seeks to determine the likelihood that the doctor's negligence caused the patient's ultimate injury. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 27) (noting that an attributable risk of 53% establishes that "the defendant's negligence probably caused the ultimate injury"). But, as the Supreme Court of New Mexico has rightly pointed out:
[U]nder the lost-chance theory, the patient does not allege that the malpractice caused his or her entire injury. Rather, the claim is that the health care provider's negligence reduced the chance of avoiding the injury actually sustained. Thus, it is that chance in and of itself-the lost opportunity of avoiding the presenting problem and achieving a better result-that becomes the item of value for which the patient seeks compensation. Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1283 (N.M. 1999) (citations omitted). In short, both the relative risk and attributable risk methods focus on the ultimate injury rather than the lost opportunity, and therefore, represent just another method of proving traditional tort causation. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 32, 36) (recognizing this criticism to his approach, but suggesting that the attributable risk approach will limit the cases in which loss of chance analysis has to be utilized in the first place). In this sense, these types of analyses are not properly categorized as loss of chance approaches to tort recovery.
!d.

67.
See King, supra note 5, at 1387.
68.
See id. at 1377. As King wrote:
The ali-or-nothing approach to loss of a chance ... subverts the deterrence objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses. By placing such losses outside tort law, the ali-or-nothing approach distorts the loss-assigning role of that law.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW happened absent the negligence. 69 All in all, King asserted that his approach of valuing the interest harmed by the defendant's conduct best supported the loss allocation and deterrence goals of tort law.
70
C. Criticisms Surrounding the Lost Chance Approach
Although lost chance theory can claim the advantages discussed in the preceding Section, criticisms of this approach abound and only fourteen states (at the time of the writing of this Article) have clearly adopted a lost chance theory in the medical malpractice context. 71 The criticisms of the lost chance approach can be categorized into two main groups: (1) the inevitable problems surrounding the valuation of a loss of a chance and subsequent jury confusion on the remedial issues to be decided;
72 and (2) the lack of a principled basis for limiting application of loss of a chance to a certain range of cases.
73
First, with regard to the concern that valuing these losses of chance is incredibly complex, it might be true to an extent that to put a value on such opportunities may be little more than an elaborate, arbitrary guessing game. 74 Moreover, as confusing as civil litigation is today for
69.
See id. at 1378.
70.
See id. at 1381 (arguing that the ali-or-nothing approach "undermines the loss-assigning function of tort law by improperly externalizing significant costs of various enterprises"). 72. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3) (suggesting that lost chance theory mathematical calculations may pose too great of a challenge for both litigants and decision-makers).
73. Moore, supra note 13, at 214.
74.
See Fischer, supra note 9, at 621 (maintaining that the application of lost chance theory may lead to "widely speculative damages" as a result of little evidence concerning the magnitude of the loss of chance); Wax, supra note 5, at 1224 ("A probabilistic rule that requires assigning a precise probability to the elements ... that
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A Public Interest Model 761 the average juror, the last thing we need, the argument goes, is a further complication of the issues in dispute. 75 Be that as it may, these types of conjectures also occur both in normal causation analysis 76 and in the comparative negligence setting, 77 and yet juries are commonly asked to rely on their innate sense of fairness and common sense.
78 ln any event, using probability analysis to engage in transparene 9 loss valuations is still preferable to maintaining the use of the aU-or-nothing approach with its harsh, arbitrary, and unfair results. 75.
See Truckor, supra note 17, at 364 (observing that lost chance theory is confusing to juries and statistics can be easily manipulated by experts); see also Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213-14 (Md. 1990) (refusing to adopt lost chance theory because of concern about misuse of "unreliable, misleading, easily manipulated, and confusing" statistical information). Nevertheless, as discussed below, the difficulty of calculating probabilities may be somewhat assuaged in the employment discrimination eontext where judges will be primarily responsible for calculating lost chance values. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
76.
See Jorgensen, 616 N.W.2d at 371 (maintaining that the fact that lost chance doctrine relies on statistical evidence "in order to assign a value to the lost chance" does not make the theory more speculative because "such use of mathematical calculations is already necessary under traditional standards of causation" to show that the plaintiff once enjoyed a greater than even chance of surviving), abrogated by legislative amendment, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.
77.
Some may argue that comparing lost chance analysis to comparative negligence analysis is inapt because lost chance deals with probabilities about some occurrence in the real world, while comparative fault involves a normative assessment and, therefore, has no objective measure (the author would like to thank Professor Michael D. Green for sharing his views on this particular topic). Although I agree with Green's view of the two concepts, nevertheless, both analyses are similar in requiring apportionments that would appear to permit a plaintiff to recover without proving that the defendant's negligence more probably than not caused her injury. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 25) (" [N] ow that many courts fully apportion damages among litigants according to their share of responsibility for an injury, the loss-of-a-chance theory as an issue of valuation rather than causation no longer looks so terribly radical.").
78. -so:--Fischef. supra note 9, at 640 ("It is better that plaintiff recover something on the basis of the best estimate possible, even if it is based on averages, than that she recover nothing."); King, supra note 5, at 1385, 1387 ("[l]n spite of its unavoidable inexactness, the compensation of lost chances will introduce a substantial higher level of precision and, therefore, validity into the loss-assigning process."); see also Aagaard, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW Second, some commentators and jurists have argued that in order for lost chance theory to be viable, it is necessary to develop limiting principles that restrict its application. Such limitation is necessary, it is argued, so that lost chance theory does not lead to a mad rush to the courthouse and to an even more foreboding form of liability for employers, which may lead to unintended consequences, including more restrictive hiring and promotion practices.
81
Although these concerns certainly have resonance, lost chance theory can be properly limited by applying a de minimis threshold. For instance, one possible limiting standard would be to restrict loss of chance recoveries to plaintiffs who had at least a 10% chance of receiving a job prior to the employer's discriminatory conduct.
82
Such an approach would certainly address concerns regarding "flooding the courts with speculative cases. " 83 In any event, the issue concerning whether there should be a de minimis exception to lost chance theory is separate from whether lost chance theory should be utilized at all.
84
As Judge Posner wrote in Doll v.
Brown in 1996:
supra note 49, at 1336; Truckor, supra note 17, at 361.
81.
See Moore, supra note 13, at 214 (observing that some courts have limited the lost chance approach to cases of serious injury or death, or also requiring that the loss of a chance be substantial or significimt); see also Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("To avoid flooding the courts with speculative cases, the lost chance to be actionable should no doubt exceed a de minimis threshold.") (citations omitted).
82.
There is nothing magical about the 10% threshold selected, although this number has heen found to be "substantial" as a matter of law by at least one court. See Pipe v. Hamilton, 56 P.3d 823, 829 (Kan. 2002). As the Supreme Court of Kansas stated in Pipe: "Pipe contends a 10 percent chance of survival is more than a trifling matter and is something that Kansas public policy supports as being recognized as substantial. We agree. As a matter of law, a 10 percent loss of chance cannot be said to be token or de minimis." /d.; see also Moore, supra note 13, at 214, 215 n.lOl (noting that some courts have sought to limit the lost chance theory by requiring that the percentage lost be substantial or significant and recommending that courts specify a range of percentages that qualify as substantial). But see Perez, 805 P.2d at 592 (observing that a 10% loss of chance would probably not qualify as a substantial loss of chance under the doctrine).
83. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206. It may be said here that it is unlikely that such a mad rush to the courthouse would be caused by a pure loss of chance theory as the smallness of potential awards would not give individual plaintiffs enough incentive to pursue such awards. On the other hand, if a class action attorney brings a big enough class made up of plaintiffs each having less than a 1 % chance of recovery, the incentive may be there for the lawyer to bring the claim if he can convince enough potential plaintiffs, and in particular a good lead plaintiff, to pursue the action. This latter scenario actually suggests that there should be a de minimis level of chance that must be exceeded before a case is considered appropriate for the lost chance approach.
84.
See, e.g., Delaney, 873 P.2d at 185-86 (recognizing a lost chance theory of recovery, while at the same time disapproving of lost chance recovery for "token or de minimis" losses of chance).
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To avoid flooding the courts with speculative cases, the lost chance to be actionable should no doubt exceed a de minimis threshold .... But that is a detail which, important as it is for keeping the concept of the lost chance within reasonable bounds, does not qualify the essential soundness of the method. The Supreme Court of Washington adopted the loss of a chance remedial approach in 1983 in the seminal case of Herskovits. 86 In that case, the court was called on to decide whether an estate could maintain an action for professional negligence based on the failure to timely diagnose the decedent's lung cancer.
87
As in the hypothetical example presented above, the estate could show that the defendants' negligence caused a decrease in the likelihood of the decedent surviving the cancer, but could not establish "but for" liability. 88 Specifically, the misdiagnosis of the decedent's lung cancer caused a 14% percent reduction (from 39% to 25%) in the chance of survival. 89 In an interesting division of opinions, the supreme court, sitting en bane, ruled in favor of the plaintiff six to three. 90 The lead opinion, in which only two justices joined, found that "medical testimony of a reduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury. " 91 Thus, these two judges, following the so-called "increased 85 Rather than defining the injury as a loss of a chance at survival, which the defendant clearly caused, 94 the lead decision improperly defined the interest harmed in terms of the actual loss of decedent's life, 95 making it nearly impossible to establish that the defendants caused the decedent's harm. 96 Nevertheless, the lead decision used the "increased risk" doctrine to resurrect the plaintiff's case. 97 Stating that it is not for the "wrongdoer, who put the possibility of recovery beyond realization, to say afterward that the result was inevitable, " 98 the lead opinion permits the issue of causation to go to the jury to determine whether the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a "significant" chance of recovery, and thereby allows the jury to make the step from increased risk to causation. 99 Consequently, the lead decision in Finally, and albeit in a footnote, the concurring opinion finds the statistics, showing a loss of a 14% chance of survival by the defendant's action, most appropriate for determining the amount of damages, rather than as a method of establishing causation. 105 Interestingly, the Herskovits concurrence appears to adopt a modified lost chance theory. In reviewing cases cited by the plaintiff, Justice Pearson notes that three of the cases involve instances in which the chance of survival was greater than 50%, and that in such cases the injury is properly recognized as the death of the decedent. 106 That being said, the concurring opinion is not clear as to why it rejects King's "pure" version of lost chance theory, which would have instead required However, it seems to be improperly conflating the increased risk doctrine with lost chance theory. See id. (Pearson, J., concurring). Whereas increased risk doctrine is still based on a causation inquiry and permits the jury to make "[t]he step from the increased risk to causation," id. , (Pearson, J., concurring) lost chance theory focuses on redefining the interest harmed and then valuing that interest. See Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1344 ("Unlike the increased-risk claim, which seeks compensation for the possibility that an as-yet unmanifested injury will occur in the future, the harm in a lost chance case already has materialized.").
101. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring) (explicitly stating that this conclusion to adopt lost chance theory was based on the "thoughtful discussion" of King).
102. WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW lost chance theory principles to be applied across the board even to better-than-even-chance cases.
107
In any event, after Herskovits, a number of courts adopted the lost chance theory in the medical malpractice context. 108 Moreover, the lost chance theory has found some resonance among scholarly commentators and courts in such areas as wrongful life jurisprudence. 109 That being said, almost all courts that have adopted lost chance analysis in the medical malpractice context have generally refused to extend it outside of those confines. 110 Recently, however, the Seventh Circuit has sought to break that trend by introducing lost chance theory into the employment discrimination context.
II. THE INTRODUCTION OF "PURE" LOST CHANCE THEORY INTO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
It would be another thirteen years after the Herskovits decision until lost chance theory would be applied to probabilistic injuries in the employment discrimination context. 111 Judge Posner first suggested this approach in the case of Doll. Specifically, Doll believed that because of a laryngectomy and tracheotomy stemming from throat cancer, he was forced to undertake a less desirable job (a parts and tool attendant) while he recovered, and was thereafter both refused reinstatement to his original electrician position and was not considered for a promotion to the electrical foreman position.
115
After the federal district court found in Doll's favor at the conclusion of a bench trial, 116 it reinstated him to his original, presickness electrician position.
117
On the issue of whether he would have been further promoted to the electrical foreman position in the absence of discrimination, the district court sought to cobble together a remedial resolution based on the fact that it was unclear whether Doll would have actually received the foreman position.
118 In this regard, the court awarded Doll over $61,000 in back pay, 119 and issued declaratory relief requiring that the Veterans hospital consider Doll for the electrician foreman position next time it became vacant.
120
On appeal, Judge Posner, writing for a three judge panel of the Seventh Circuit, 121 came to a rather unexceptional conclusion in vacating and remanding the district court's remedy. Finding that the case was a so-called "no-injury case,"
122 the court focused on the nature of the 122. In a "no-injury case," the plaintiff has proven liability and the defendant seeks to escape the imposition of damages by establishing by some burden of persuasion that tbe plaintiff was made no worse off by the discrimination. See id. at 1202 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 362; Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73). In contradistinction, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW burden that the defendant must meet in order to escape having to pay damages or any other forms of relief.
123 Although Judge Posner was uncomfortable requiring defendants in no-injury cases to meet the clear and convincing burden of persuasion, the government defendant failed to properly brief the issue, and he, therefore, could make no ruling on this issue. 123. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1202. One of the significant ways in which constitutional and statutory torts in the employment discrimination context differ from the garden-variety medical malpractice or products liability tort is the availability of affirmative defenses to the defendant once the plaintiff carries her burden by proving that defendant has engaged in unlawful employment discrimination. See id. (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 362; and Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73). Even if the plaintiff proves the employer has violated the law, the case does not end there. Instead, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that its actions made the employee no worse off; that is, the employer's actions caused the employee no iqjury. See id. In such a case, the defendant is not disclaiming liability, but seeking to reduce damages to a nominal level by arguing in essence that even though unlawful discrimination occurred, it did not cause any iqjury to the plaintiff. See id.
To those familiar with employment discrimination law, this shifting of the burden of persuasion is similar to what occurs with the "same decision" test in mixed-motive analysis, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), or what occurs with the shifting of the burden of persuasion in the damages phase of Teamsters pattern and practice litigation. See 431 U.S. at 359 ("By 'demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice' the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of discrimination against the individual class members; the burden therefore shifted to the employer 'to prove that individuals who reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination. " Posner was confused why the district court judge awarded full back pay to Doll, but nevertheless only ordered that he be considered for a promotion the next time the electrician foreman position became available. 125 Instead, he thought that the district court should have either followed the traditional ali-or-nothing approach and deny all relief to Doll, or it should have granted full relief, including full back pay along with either: (1) instatement into the electrical foreman position, or failing that, (2) front pay relief to place him in approximately the same position he would have been absent the discrimination.
126
Because the district judge did not take either approach, Judge Posner vacated the back pay award and remanded the case back to the district court to determine the appropriate remedy for Doll. 127 Nevertheless, because the district judge appeared to be torn between the fact that Doll was unlawfully discriminated against by the government in applying for the promotion to the foreman position, and the fact that the evidence suggested that Doll would probably not have received the foreman position even in the absence of discrimination, Judge Posner could not resist making another suggestion as to how the district judge could appropriately "split the difference" in fashioning a remedy for Doll. 128 Although not required to do so in order to reach the holding in the case, 129 Judge Posner suggested that the district court implement lost chance theory by applying the clear and convincing evidence rule governing the defendant's no-injury defense to "probabilities as distinct from certainties of loss. "
130
The lost chance theory's focus on probabilities seemed to correspond perfectly with this type of employment discrimination case, where "proof of injury is inescapably uncertain. (recognizing the lost chance doctrine's appropriateness in scenarios in which "it is proven that the defendant's active, tortious conduct probably caused the victim's materialized injury and the only question is to what extent to reduce damages for that injury to reflect the likelihood that the victim's preexisting condition would produce harm independent of the tortious conduct").
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theory's origins in medical. malpractice cases, 132 Judge Posner expressed his opinion that the theory was "basically sound" and was merely "an extension of the routine practice in tort cases involving disabling injuries of discounting lost future earnings by the probability that the plaintiff would have been alive and working in each of the years for which damages are sought. " 133 Relying upon King's seminal article, Judge Posner argued in Doll that what should be compensated in cases involving "the inescapably probabilistic character of many injuries" is not the loss of the job itself, but rather the loss of the opponunity to receive the job because of the employer's unlawful discriminatory conduct.
134 Compensating plaintiffs on the loss of a chance to obtain a job was necessary in order to avoid undercompensation and underdeterrence, on one hand, or overcompensation and overdeterrence, on the other .
135
And, even though Judge Posner recognized the somewhat arbitrary nature of saying that someone lost a 25% chance of obtaining a job, 136 he nevertheless argued that such calculations would be no different from the calculations juries make all the time when they apportion fault under a comparative negligence statute.
137
In the end, Judge Posner argued that doing these probability calculations front and center in order to split the difference in employment discrimination cases involving inherently uncertain injuries was far preferable to district court judges splitting the difference as they saw fit, perhaps based on nothing more than their own gut feelings.
138
Nevertheless, recognizing that the application of lost chance theory to employment discrimination was an issue of first impression and had not 132 
Suppose there were five applicants for one job, the employer discriminated against four, and all four were equally well qualified, and the fifth got the job. Would all four of the discriminated-against applicants be entitled to back pay, one to the job, and the other three to front pay? Obviously not; yet without the lost-chance concept, which could grant reinstatement to none of the four and 25 percent front pay to each of them, the employer would get off scot-free. It was not until about two years later that a district court judge took Judge Posner up on his invitation to apply the lost chance theory to an employment discrimination dispute.
141
And, it was not until another three years later in 2001 that the Seventh Circuit sanctioned on appeal the district court's application of the lost chance theory for probabilistic injuries in the employment discrimination context.
142
In Bishop, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the district court judge erred in applying the lost chance remedial theory to determine monetary damages awards for three prevailing plaintiffs who did not receive retroactive promotions in a reverse race discrimination case. Each of these three prevailing plaintiffs objected to the application of the lost chance approach and argued that each of them should have been awarded the full value of the job for their unlawful discriminatory treatment. 144 In denying the plaintiffs their requested relief, Judge Terence T. Evans, writing for the Seventh Circuit majority, first noted that to award full compensation to all three plaintiffs, especially where two were competing for the same job, would not only be wrong, but "obviously wrong. "
145 Harkening back to the hypothetical offered by Judge Posner in Doll involving multiple candidates for a single promotion, 146 the Bishop court maintained that the traditional ali-or-nothing approach to situations such as these would inevitably lead to windfall recoveries for plaintiffs. 147 Instead, the appellate court agreed with the district court in using the "tort approach" based on the loss of a chance. 148 Under this approach, the district court calculated the plaintiffs' damages by assessing their chances of receiving the competitive promotion in the absence of discrimination. 149 For instance, two of the three plaintiffs placed third and fourth respectively on a promotion list, but the person who placed first accepted a different job, and the person who placed second had been out of the particular district, and therefore, the court reduced his chances of actually accepting the promotion to only 25%. 150 Although not fully explaining how he arrived at his numbers, the district judge found that the plaintiffs who placed third and fourth on the promotion had a 45% chance and 30% chance of receiving 144. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015. Nothing in the Teamsters decision, however, suggests that the relief awarded to individual plaintiffs within a group or class must be "full" relief. See generally 431 U.S. 324. Indeed, the Teamster Court observed that a trial court must hold mini-hearings in the damage phase of these cases in order to award appropriate relief to each member of the class. See id. at 361 ("When the [class] seeks individual relief for the victims of the discriminatory practice, a district court must usually conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of individual relief.").
145. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015-16. As the Bishop court stated: "What plaintiffs are really complaining about is that they did not each make a full recovery, which, as we shall see, at least in the case of [ 
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the promotion, respectively, and thus, were entitled to only that percentage of the value of the job.
151
While the appellate court recognized that lost chance theory involved "more art than science," 152 it nevertheless approved the theory for these types of employment discrimination cases, finding that similar types of calculations are made all the time in other contexts, such as in comparative negligence cases. 153 Perhaps more importantly, the use of lost chance theory in this context struck the court as the "likeliest way to arrive at a just result," and thus, it fully affirmed the lost chance calculations of the district court. witnessed by the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Biondo, 157 the Seventh Circuit remains steadfast in applying the lost chance theory to probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination cases, even when such cases involve speculative future promotions.
In Biondo, nineteen firefighters and engineers sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and Title VII for reverse race discrimination when they were not promoted to the rank of lieutenant after taking a oeompetitive promotion examination in 1986.
158
They alleged that the City of Chicago had maintained racially segregated promotion lists, and that in the absence of these lists, they would have been promoted to lieutenant.
159
Moreover, these plaintiffs maintained that there was some likelihood that after becoming lieutenants, they would have sought further promotions to the rank of captain and battalion chief. 160 After finding in the plaintiffs' favor, the district court ordered various forms of injunctive relief and utilized the lost chance method to determine the value of the probabilistic injuries each of these firefighters and engineers suffered. 161 Although neither the parties nor the Seventh Circuit quarreled with the central approach of the district court in using the lost chance theory to determine the value of these probabilistic injuries, some of the results arrived at by the juries 162 were baffling. 163 Consequently, Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the appellate panel, reevaluated the evidence on his way to vacating the damage award with instructions for the district court to follow on remand. 164 First, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that all of the plaintiffs should receive 100% of the value of the lieutenant promotions, retroactive to when they would have received the promotion in the absence of the multiple obligations before joinder is necessary") (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2)(ii)). In the end, the court ordered joinder of the other potential plaintiffs in order to avoid posing inconsistent obligations on the defendant. 165 Unlike a situation in which there are multiple candidates for just one position, 166 this case provided an example in which the first promotion was never in doubt in the absence of the racially segregated selection test; but, it was unclear whether, and how successful, these same firefighters and engineers would have been if they applied for later promotions to the captain and thereafter, to the battalion chief positions. 167 Judge Easterbrook estimated that promoted lieutenants in the Chicago Fire Department had about a 33% chance of subsequently attaining the captain position. 168 He also calculated that once becoming a captain, firefighters had a 41% chance of then becoming a battalion chief. 169 As a result, he calculated the chance of rising from the lieutenant position to the battalion chief position at 14%Y 0 Overall, Judge Easterbrook concluded his damage calculation 165 . Because there were enough positions available for all plaintiffs to receive promotions to the lieutenant position, and all would have been promoted absent the use of racially discriminatory selection criteria, each plaintiff had a 100% chance of receiving the promotion absent discrimination. See id. at 688 ("[I]f a person would have had a 25% chance of promotion from lieutenant to captain, then preventing that person from bci:oming a lieutenant should lead to a remedy equal to 100% of the benefits of being a lieutenant plus 25% of the incremental benefits of being a captain."). Judge Easterbrook observed, however, that this calculation will only hold true if we are to assume that all of the plaintiffs are risk neutral. See id. Although he admits that such plaintiffs would likely be risk averse and pay to reduce the risk (so that the proper award should be something less than the actuarial value), for simplicity sake he continues on with his risk neutral assumption. See id.
166. This was the case in both Bishop and Doll. See supra Part II.A-B. 167. Biondo, 382 F.3d. at 690. Additionally, the plaintiffs made their lost chance showing more difficult by failing to provide comparative evidence of how similarly situated white firefighters and engineers who were promoted to lieutenant subsequently fared on later the captain and battalion chief competitive examinations. /d. at 689. Instead, the plaintiffs merely adduced evidence about their education and experience and the fact that they loved their work, were committed to the fire department, strived to succeed, and studied hard for the promotion tests. Additionally, for the ten plaintiffs who the jury believed had a chance of achieving the battalion chief level, they would receive an additional 14% of the value of the battalion chief position benefits.
172
Thus, Biondo represents yet another example of how the lost chance method may be utilized to determine difficult remedial issues. 173 But, unlike the Doll and Bishop decisions, which involved only the determination of the probability of multiple candidates receiving a promotion for one available job, Biondo provides a future promotions scenario with the additional complication of determining the future career paths of many plaintiffs who have been denied advancement in the midst of their careers. 174 Although the "average worker" followed by Judge Easterbrook 175 in Biondo is less than perfect, especially in the absence of specific comparative evidence, its calculations nevertheless appear to provide a skilled approximation of the probabilistic injuries suffered by these types of plaintiffs. 171. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. 172. See id. Moreover, because "[al change in the promotion probabilities and dates requires everything else to be redone," Judge Easterbrook also instructed the district court on remand to recalculate the equitable remedies (including back pay, front pay, and entitlement to seniority and pensions), and hold a new trial limited to the recalculation of "back pay and damages for emotional distress on the assumption that each of the plaintiffs who has yet to reach captain lost a 33% chance of promotion by 2002." /d. But see infra note 240 (asserting that lost chance analysis should not be part of the compensatory damage analysis undertaken by the jury in an employment discrimination case).
173. See Biondo, 382 F.3d. at 690 (using the lost chance method to determine damages). But see United States v. City of Miami, 195 F.3d 1292, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 1999) (addressing a similar promotion case in which the court avoided a quagmire of hypothetical judgments associated with the lost chance theory and instead awarded a class-wide remedy, giving each eligible plaintiff in each ranking level a pro rata share).
174. See Griffin, 5 F.3d at 189 (discussing the difficulty of determining the appropriate relief in cases in which an initial unlawful discriminatory employment action may cost the plaintiff chances for later career advancement).
175. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. The "average worker" approach was actually first suggested by Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit in Griffin. See 5 F.3d at 189.
176. As will be discussed below, the ideal situation for lost chance analysis in the employment discrimination context would permit a fact finder to engage in individual fact-finding to approximate as closely as possible the chance the individual had to obtain a position prior to the discrimination. See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text. The "average worker" test, however, may be useful in cases like Biondo as a substitute Although Doll involved language contemplating the utilization of a pure version of lost chance theory in the employment discrimination context, 177 neither Bishop nor Biondo consider the efficacy of pure lost chance theory in this context. 178 Consequently, it is necessary to consider whether courts in the future should adopt a pure lost chance theory to calculate the value of probabilistic injuries in the employment discrimination context. This Article posits that the adoption of such an approach would be inappropriate for two primary reasons. First, from a statutory standpoint, pure lost chance theory primarily satisfies the private, "make whole" relief goal of employment discrimination law, while failing to give sufficient attention to the public interests that such laws are also intended to serve. Second, from a prudential standpoint, the pure version of lost chance gives zealous defense counsel an additional opportunity to confuse the remedial issues for the fact finder, and by extension, may significantly add to the administrative costs associated with the litigation of such disputes.
179
A. Statutory Concerns Regarding Pure Lost Chance Theory
Although allowing defendant employers the ability to set off employment discrimination awards by the probability that the plaintiff would have received the job in better-than-even-chance cases appears to be a logical extension of themes underlying lost chance theory, 180 under closer scrutiny, it is not compatible with one of the central purposes of 177. See supra Part Il.A. 178. This is because neither Bishop nor Biondo involved fact scenarios in which the plaintiffs had more than a 50% chance of receiving a promotion, as Doll speculated might be the situation in some circumstances. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206.
/d.
179. See Ellis, supra note 23, at 372. As Lori Ellis wrote:
It seems likely that in jurisdictions that have already adopted loss of chance for cases below fifty-one percent, the defense bar may advocate extending loss of chance to better-than-even cases in an effort to limit damages to the value of the 'lost chance' rather than full damages for wrongful death.
180. See King, supra note 5, at 1387 (advocating the application of lost chance theory to better-than-even-chance cases); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 66, at 253 (advocating the adoption of a pure form of lost chance theory in the tort context to avoid systematic overcompensation of plaintiffs and overdeterrence of defendants).
778
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW employment discrimination law. 181 As discussed above, Title VII and other similar employment discrimination laws were enacted by Congress not only to provide a private remedy for those unlawfully discriminated against, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to serve the public goal of eliminating unlawful discrimination from the American economy.
182
In order to take into account both the private and the public statutory purposes of employment discrimination laws, courts should be able to overcompensate plaintiffs with "punitive-type" equitable relief in cases in which a better-than-even chance of proving discrimination has been established in order to satisfy the larger public interest goals of employment discrimination law.
183
Punitive-type equitable relief does not mean the traditional monetary punitive damages that have been available for intentional discrimination under Title VII since Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (" 1991 Act"). 184 Rather, punitive-type equitable relief in Here, unless we utilize punitive-type equitable relief, there is a significant chance that the public-regarding aspects of employment discrimination law wiii go unfulfilled. See id. at 939-40 (suggesting that, although foreseeing some problems, "if there is a component of harm that otherwise would be omitted, a policy of including it in the form of punitive damages would seem to be beneficial"). And, although Polinsky and Shavell refer to these monetary awards as "damages," and this Article refers to them as "equitable relief," the distinction is really semantic if at the end of the day the plaintiff is compensated monetarily for the violation of the public interest caused by the employer's wrongful conduct.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Under the 1991 Act, it is now clearly established that punitive damages are available in Title VII and the ADA cases in which an employer has engaged in "discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." /d. § 1981a(b)(1). The Supreme Court has further elucidated this standard in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass 'n by focusing on whether an employer discriminated against an employee in the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate federal law. 527
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185
In this regard, this relief will serve not so much to "punish" a specific employer for particularly egregious conduct, 186 but more to satisfy the broader statutory mandate of deterring all employers throughout the economy from engaging in unlawful employment discrimination.
Clearly, individual plaintiffs in better-than-even-chance cases will not object if they receive the full value of the job they have more likely than not lost through unlawful discrimination. Employers, on the other hand, will maintain that they should be on the hook only for the damage they actually caused.
187
There are at least three responses to these employers. First, to the extent that the employer has discriminated and has made it impossible to determine the exact chance a plaintiff would have had to obtain the position in the absence of discrimination, he should not now be permitted to use that uncertainty as a legal sword to U.S. 526, 536 (1999). Moreover, in this context, punitive damages cannot be imputed to the employer if the employer can prove that the employment decisions of its managerial agents were contrary to its good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. See deterrence implies that injurers should have to pay for the entire harm they cause, in order that injurers take appropriate precautions and that prices and participation in risky activities are proper."). WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW reduce his damage exposure. 188 If anything, such employers should have to suffer from the uncertainty caused by their unlawful conduct, not the wronged plaintiff. 189 Second, the Supreme Court has again and again emphasized the prophylactic purposes of employment discrimination law.
190
Employment discrimination law is not just about compensating victims, or even deterring employer conduct, but rather seeks to give employers the incentive to take preventative steps to make the workplace more welcoming to all. 191 Thus, if an employer reasonably seeks to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, and the employee unreasonably fails to take advantage of such preventative opportunities or otherwise fails to avoid harm, the employer has an affirmative defense against vicarious liability in such cases. 192 Similarly, in the punitive damages context, if the employer attempts in good faith to follow the dictates of Title VII, whatever the egregiousness of the supervisor's conduct, the employer will not be found liable for punitive damages. 193 Likewise, an award of full equitable relief in these better-than-even-chance cases can be seen as an additional incentive for employers to take preventative action before misconduct diminishes an opportunity for hiring or advancement in the workplace. 194 Third, perhaps the best argument is that the lost chance doctrine should never apply in a better-than-even-chance case. 195 As courts and commentators alike have argued, once a plaintiff is able to show, by the preponderance of the evidence, that it is more likely than not that the defendant caused her ultimate injury, there is no need to identify the 188. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 3 ("When defendants bear responsibility for the gap in evidence, the case is especially strong [to relax the preponderance threshold}."); see also United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1098-99 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to consider the probability of the plaintiff being hired and instead construed ambiguities against the employer); Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1406-07 (D.D.C. 1991) (finding that, because the defendant was unable to show how many promotions were available, ambiguities were resolved against the employer and each plaintiff was awarded full back pay as if they had received the promotion).
189. See King, supra note 5, at 1378. A similar argument has been made for shifting accident costs to manufacturers under a strict liability theory in the products liability context. See James A. Henderson harm as the loss of the opportunity. 196 In other words, loss of chance doctrine only provides for a percentage of damages based on the probability of a favorable outcome in the absence of the defendant's unlawful conduct. But, if a plaintiff under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach can establish that it is more likely than not that the wrongdoer caused the ultimate harm, there is no need to depend on the subsidiary theory and its lesser compensations. 197 Thus, both traditional causation standards and the public nature of employment discrimination statutes support a modified approach to lost chance theory in the employment discrimination context. To the extent overcompensation is argued to result as a consequence of this remedial scheme, 198 such additional compensation should be seen as an equitable remedy necessary to effectuate the broader public deterrence purposes of employment discrimination statutes.
199
B. Prudential Concerns Regarding Pure Lost Chance Theory
In addition to the important statutory concerns regarding the publicoriented nature of employment discrimination law, further prudential considerations counsel against adopting the pure lost chance theory in the employment discrimination context. These prudential concerns can be grouped into two main areas.
First, and chief among these concerns, are the perverse incentives Such incentives will inevitably occur because almost no plaintiff in a competitive hiring or promotion case will be able to prove that she had an absolute, 100% chance of receiving a position.
202
A loss of a chance argument will normally be available to defense counsel to argue that in the absence of discrimination, there were many other reasons why the employee did not receive the position. 203 Consequently, the record of these cases will be further clouded as various forms of complex evidence are adduced to approximate the exact chance a plaintiff had of receiving a job. 204 Second, the additional administrative costs introduced into these types of employment discrimination cases by way of the pure lost chance theory must be considered. Law and economics scholars refer to administrative costs as "the legal and other expenses and costs [including time and effort] borne by parties in resolving disputes that arise when harm occurs. " 205 There is little doubt that the added complexity of lost chance theory will exacerbate to some degree the administrative costs associated with litigation. 206 to present dueling experts and adduce intricate evidence concerning the probability of an individual receiving a particular position.
207
However, to the extent that these lost chance awards are limited to equitable relief such as back pay, reinstatement, and front pay, judges will be the ones considering statistical evidence and dueling experts.
208
Although by no means error-proof, judges will be more likely to minimize the additional administrative costs this type of evidence will no doubt cause. Recent case law suggests, however, that juries will be involved in these lost chance calculations in employment discrimination cases as these damages may not only involve equitable relief, but also emotional distress damages, and potentially, punitive damages.
209
Compensatory and punitive damages are remedial issues that a plaintiff may decide to have a jury determine under the 1991 Act. 210 Given this fact, the minimization of administrative costs through the use of judges in these cases is somewhat questionable.
In short, prudential considerations also counsel against adoption of Pollard also makes clear that front pay is a type of equitable relief under Title VII. Id. at 854 (finding that front pay is a type of equitable remedy under Section 706(g) of Title VII). In this sense, lost chance theory in the employment discrimination context may have a decided advantage over its tort law counterpart to the extent that judges rather than juries will be handling these complex probabilistic calculations. But see Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3 n.3) (discussing computation blunders made by judges in loss of a chance cases).
209. See Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. Traditional punitive damages would probably not be available in lost chance employment discrimination cases, as it makes less sense to say that an employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice ... with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual," see 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(l), when the plaintiff had only lost less than a 50% chance of receiving a competitive position. This is even more so considering the the pure lost chance theory in better-than-even-chance employment discrimination cases because it inappropriately provides additional opportunities to cloud the remedial issues and needlessly increases administrative costs to the litigation system.
IV. A PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL FOR APPLYING LOST CHANCE THEORY TO PROBABILISTIC INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. Setting Up the Employment Discrimination Litigation Context for Lost Chance Theory
In place of pure lost chance theory, this Article advances a public interest approach for remedying probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination litigation. Before setting out the components of this approach, however, it is important to first set out the legal framework for an employment discrimination case to establish at what points the lost chance analysis may come into play.
In a run-of-the-mill intentional employment discrimination case 211 under Title VII, 212 the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her race, sex, color, national origin, or religion.
213
Although there may be different proof frameworks available to the plaintiff depending upon the type of evidence available, 214 any such employment discrimination case consists of a plaintiff establishing liability for unlawful discrimination under the applicable framework by the preponderance of the evidence. 216 Moreover, up to the point when liability attaches, lost chance theory should not play any role in the legal analysis. 217 Once liability has been established, the defendant may have various substantive defenses at its disposal to either reduce or completely defeat the amount of damages. ·For instance, in a mixed-motive case under Title VII, the defendant can substantially diminish the amount of damages by establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the. same decision regarding the plaintiff even in the absence of unlawful discrimination. 218 Similarly, in a group disparate treatment case, although a presumption of liability for every plaintiff in a group or class is established once liability is proven, the employer may establish that an individual plaintiff in the group is entitled to less or no relief.
219
As far as the interaction between these employment discrimination substantive defenses and lost chance theory, Judge Posner has suggested that a district judge could "apply [the defendant's burden of proof] to probabilities as distinct from certainties of loss. " 22° For instance, 217. Although issues of causation must be decided during the liability phase of employment discrimination litigation, lost chance only involves the reconceptualizing of the harm caused by the defendant and then the valuation of that harm. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 4 (recognizing that reconceptualizing the interest harmed is at the heart of the lost chance approach).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (providing that the plaintiff is limited to declaratory relief, specific types of injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs if the defendant meets the same decision test). Importantly, if the defendant is able to satisfy the same decision test, no form of monetary damages or equitable relief is available. Thus, once the interest harmed is identified as the opportunity of receiving a position, the employer, through its defenses, can adduce evidence to seek to establish the loss of chance the plaintiff actually suffered. 222 On the other hand, if the defendant cannot meet its burden of persuasion under the same decision test or any other substantive defense, the fact finder will be free to set the percentage lost based on the relevant evidence presented by the parties in the liability phase of the case.
223
B. The Fundamentals of the Public Interest Model
Having placed the lost chance remedial theory into the larger employment discrimination litigation context, the following Sections set out the three steps that fact finders should follow in determining how to evaluate a loss of a chance caused by the discriminatory denial of a competitive position.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE INTEREST HARMED
First, the court must properly identify the interest lost in such probabilistic cases. 224 The interest harmed is not the ultimate job loss suffered by the plaintiff, but rather the loss of an opportunity to obtain the job without discriminatory conduct being involved. 225 Thus, the interest harmed in a competitive hiring or promotion case in the employment context is the chance of receiving a position now or in the future (for example, as in the Biondo case). 226 With regard to causation, the plaintiff must merely show that the employer's discriminatory actions were more likely than not the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs loss 221. /d. 222. /d. To be clear, in a lost chance case, the employer's defense does not go to whether the plaintiff would have received the job absent discrimination, but whether it was more likely than not that the defendant's conduct caused a certain percentage of lost opportunity in obtaining a job as a result of its unlawful discriminatory conduct. In situations where it is quite clear that only one employer was involved in discriminatorily not selecting the plaintiff for the position in question, establishing that the same employer was the "but for" cause of the plaintiff losing a certain quantum of chance should be relatively easy to establish. Second, the fact finder will have to determine the probabilities of a given plaintiff having received a job in the absence of discrimination.
229
As noted previously, this endeavor is much more art than science, 230 and the fact finder will no doubt have to engage in an empirical approximation. 231 Nevertheless, there are factors that should play a role in determining the relative likelihood that a plaintiff would have received a position in the absence of discrimination. 232 For instance, factors such as educational background, relevant past job experience, seniority, and the score on a validated performance test are all relatively objective criteria that the court could use in determining the probability of someone receiving a job. 233 In addition, each side could employ experts, utilizing comparative data of people who were actually hired or promoted, to determine the likelihood of success in the absence of discrimination. 234 Finally, the testimony of the plaintiff and other 227 . See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4) (observing that even in lost chance cases, the plaintiff must still "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's negligence caused that loss of a chance") (citing King, supra note 5, at 1394-95); see also Jorgensen, 616 N.W.2d at 370-71; Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1341. As the South Dakota Supreme Court wrote in Jorgensen: "As a distinct cause of action, the loss of a chance must still be proven under the traditional standard of proof. That is, the plaintiff must still prove ... that the defendant's conduct operated to reduce his chance of a more favorable outcome." 616 N. 234. Weigand, supra note 9, at 310 ("While expert testimony is crucial to all medical malpractice claims, it is especially so in loss of chance claims."); Truckor, supra note 17, at 364-65; see also Albright, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41 (relying on expert testimony to establish the value of the lost promotion to each plaintiff, and then multiplying the promotion value by the probability that each plaintiff would have received the promotion). Of course, to the extent that the administrative costs become too steep because this type of complex and costly evidence must be adduced for a large number of plaintiffs in a class, one could instead rely on the average worker theory utilized by Judge Easterbrook in Biondo. 382 F.3d at 690 ("Because none of the plainti~fs presented comparative evidence, the view most favorable to the plaintiffs as a WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW relevant third parties may provide valuable information for a judge seeking to approximate the probability of a plaintiff receiving a job in the absence of discrimination. 235 Once the judge calculates the initial chance that an individual plaintiff had at receiving a given job, the loss of chance calculation is simpler in the employment discrimination context than in the tort context. 236 This is because once the employer has discriminated against the plaintiff so that she can no longer receive a position, the postdiscrimination chance at receiving the job is exactly 0%. 237 In other words, although the plaintiff may eventually receive equitable or injunctive relief placing her in the same position she would have been in the absence of discrimination, 238 right after the employer discriminated against her unlawfully she has no chance of receiving the position that has now been filled by someone else. Thus, unlike the tort context in which the fact finder must calculate the odds at survival after the medical malpractice, no such calculation need take place in the employment discrimination context. If the plaintiff had a 25% chance of receiving a job prior to discrimination, once she is discriminated against and not selected, her loss of chance is also 25%.
DIVIDING PLAINTIFFS INTO APPROPRIATE LOST CHANCE
CATEGORIES
Third, and finally, depending upon the probabilities calculated, plaintiffs will be divided into three categories: better-than-even-chance plaintiffs, not-better-than-even-chance plaintiffs, and de mmtmts plaintiffs. 239 For those who are able to establish that they had more than group is that each would have done as well as the average lieutenant on the 1992 and 1998 exams.").
235. Truckor, supra note 17, at 364-65. But see Biondo, 382 F.3d at 689-90
(criticizing the use of some of these forms of evidence to determine probabilities).
236. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26).
237. In this sense, employment discrimination injuries are like those injuries in medical malpractice cases where the doctor absolutely destroys any chance a patient had at survival. /d.
238.
See supra note 208.
239. Regardless of whether there is one plaintiff or multiple plaintiffs, the employer may still be undercompensating or overcompensating the plaintiff under the public interest model. This outcome is the result of the existence of some probability that the selected candidate (that is, the individual that is not discriminated against) would have been offered the position in the absence of discrimination. See infra tbl.B. The advantage of the public interest approach to lost chance, nonetheless, includes the fact that less-than-even-chance plaintiffs will receive some compensation for their losses caused by a clearly discriminatory employer rather than none. Furthermore, in betterthan-even-chance cases, the overcompensation can be written off as equitable relief necessary for the fulfillment of employment discrimination law's public-regarding purposes. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. a 50% chance of receiving a job in the absence of discrimination, the public interest model awards the full value of the job 240 to effectuate the public interests sought to be vindicated by employment discrimination law.
241 This is also necessary to be consistent with traditional causation standards.
242
On the other hand, for those who establish a 50% chance or less of receiving a job in the absence of discrimination, lost chance theory will be applied to provide the plaintiff with an award that is equivalent to the total value of the job multiplied by the percentage of the lost chance.
243
Finally, for administrative cost reduction purposes and to prevent frivolous claims from reaching the courthouse, those plaintiffs establishing less than a 10% chance of receiving a job in the absence of discriminatory treatment will be precluded from recovering.
244
C. A Hypothetical Illustration of the Public Interest Model
To better illustrate how the public interest model will work in practice, it is helpful to consider a hypothetical employment discrimination case involving the denial of a competitive promotion for unlawful discriminatory reasons. Under the facts of this case, ABC Corporation has a standard operating procedure of not promoting African Americans to positions of responsibility in their organization. During the most recent round of promotions, the employer considered five applicants for the position of Lead Supervisor, four African American employees and one white employee. As a result of the selection process, the white applicant was selected. 240 . The "full value of the job" refers primarily to a combination of back pay, front pay, or reinstatement, which the judge will determine in her discretion. See supra note 208. Even if there is a jury seated to determine compensatory or punitive damages, these monetary awards should not impact the judge's lost chance calculations. See Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. This is because the damages for emotional distress and egregious conduct will most likely be discounted (or in the case of punitive damages, not awarded at all) as a result of the jury considering the likelihood of a plaintiff having received a position absent discrimination. Jd. In any event, such calculations should not affect the judge's equitable determination concerning what the job is worth in terms of back pay, front pay, or reinstatement. /d.
241.
See supra note 25. One additional interesting issue that will need to be addressed when determining the "full value of the job" is when the applicable limitations period accrues. See Weigand, supra note 9, at 309. Because the interest harmed in loss chance cases is the loss of an opportunity, the limitations period should start to run at the time the opportunity is denied, not when the ultimate harm occurs. Jd. However, this confusion should not arise in the employment discrimination context, as the time the opportunity is denied and the time when the ultimate harm occurs are the same. 245 The evidence establishes quite clearly that the candidates all had the necessary educational background for the position in question, but that the candidates' past relevant job experience could be divided into three all-inclusive groups: extensive, moderate, and minimal. As it turns out, the white employee selected for the promotion had moderate experience.
The African American employees are able to successfully show during the liability phase of the trial that the employer engaged in unlawful race discrimination in violation of Title VII. 246 Consequently, a presumption is established that each plaintiff is entitled to some level of relief. 247 Nevertheless, ABC Corporation still has the ability to show that one or more of the individual plaintiffs is not entitled to relief.
248
Assuming for the sake of the argument that ABC Corporation cannot meet its burden during the damages phase of the trial, 249 the judge 250 turns to the public interest approach to lost chance theory to fashion a remedy for the three successful plaintiffs. First, the judge identifies the interests harmed by ABC Corporation's wrongful actions. The judge identifies the harm as the loss of chance of the three African American plaintiffs to receive the promotion in question. Next, he determines that one African American plaintiff, Plaintiff A with extensive experience, had a 52% chance (that is, a better-than-even chance) of receiving the job absent discrimination, and therefore, awards the full value of the job to that plaintiff by awarding back pay and instating her into the supervisor position. 249. In a real case, the ABC Corporation might be able to prove that Plaintiff C with only minimal experience would not have received the promotion under any circumstances. Notice, however, that because the public interest model applies a 10% de minimis threshold, the result is the same regardless of the phase in which lost chance applies. See supra tbi.A.
250. For the sake of simplicity, this hypothetical assumes that no compensatory or punitive damages are being requested. For a further discussion regarding whether a judge or jury should make loss chance calculations in employment discrimination litigation, see supra notes 207, 240.
251. If instatement is inappropriate because of hostility, or because the plaintiff is already working at a different job at a different company, front pay may be utilized as an equitable remedy to place the plaintiff in the position he would have been in absent discrimination. See Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1212 (7th Cir.
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As for the remaining two African American plaintiffs, Plaintiff B has moderate experience and Plaintiff C has minimal experience, thus each has a not-better-than-even chance of receiving the position. Additionally, the other nonplaintiff African American employee had minimal experience. To value the chance of each of these individuals to receive the job, the judge establishes in total that these four remaining applicants combined (the two remaining plaintiffs, the one African American nonplaintiff and the successful white applicant) had a 48% chance of receiving the job, and that because of differences in experience, the moderate experience candidates had a 16% chance of receiving the job, whereas the minimal experience candidates had an 8% chance of receiving the job. Based on these valuations, the judge awards Plaintiff B 16% of the value of the job and awards Plaintiff C nothing under the de minimis exception. 252 
D. Preliminary Conclusions Regarding the Public Interest Model
In reviewing the results of the hypothetical discussed above, three preliminary conclusions are possible. First, the public interest approach to lost chance theory represents a principled compromise for meeting the sometimes contradictory public and private aims of employment discrimination law. 254 As a compromise to these sometimes intractable issues, it will hopefully satisfy, to some extent, both law and economic adherents who focus on proper deterrence and allocation of resources, 255 as well as those who favor the relative simplicity of the traditional alior-nothing approach.
Second, and as a result of the factual circumstances surrounding the
